The topic of this paper is how best to get a project made by different parties when one's decision may be dependent on the earlier chance events in the work of others, but the course of the task of each party is private information. We will consider the first and second price tendering strategies of the issuer in which he maximizes his minimum possible payoff, and we will show that the second price tender is efficient, and the first price tender is efficient and coalition-resistant in perfect competition and robust on this perfectness.
Introduction
Since 1973, it is known that deterministic mechanisms can be designed efficiently by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. However, many important real-life cases such as most scheduling problems are not deterministic, but stochastic. For example, if a compound task, consisting of two subtasks, should be completed before a deadline, and the second subtask can be started only after first is completed then the second should work either faster but more costly or cheaper but slower depending on the completion time of the first subtask.
In this paper, we consider such mechanisms in which a party called Issuer is the only indispensable one, and he can choose the other parties to work with. Clearly, he should call for a kind of tender for the others called applicants. Because of the optimal method may require making decisions depending on some chance events of others, the applications should contain some description about these chance events. But it raises such questions as what if the applicant achieves his worst possibility? In this case, Issuer would be unable to ascertain whether the applicant simply had bad luck, or this achievement also was much more probable than he stated it in his application.
To avoid such falsifications, Issuer uses the mistrustful strategy by which he always expects the worst possibility. The point of this is it inspires the applicants to take the risks of the uncertainty of their own work. Strange to say, but this simple strategy makes the method efficient.
To see how this inspiration works, consider the simplest nondeterministic applicant, who could have completed a task before an earlier event with p chance or only before a later event with 1-p chance. Of course, he want his offer to be considered not so as the offer for the worse case. Then what he should offer is the following.
"Beyond a fixed fee, I agree that if you say any amount of money x before I start then if I complete later I will pay you px, but if earlier then you have to pay me (1 − p)x."
Efficient: maximizes the expected total payoff of all players If the money equivalent to how much better the earlier completion for Issuer is m then Issuer should choose x = m, because this way he surely gets the mean of the payoffs of the two outcomes with the weights of their probabilities. Furthermore, the applicant expectedly also does not come off badly by this offer.
We will show that if Issuer foreshows that he cares only about his minimum possible payoff, that is why he chooses the x-es this way, then the best for the applicants is submitting applications corresponding to their real decision trees, and if they do so then the total payoff will be the largest possible.
Example for the method
We consider a project that is very risky, but may gain huge utility. It consists of two tasks, one application per task must be accepted, and if both succeed in time then Issuer gets a large sum of money, that is 60 here, but if either fails to do it then making the other task has no use. After getting all applications, Issuer evaluates all pairs of them for the different tasks and accepts the pair producing him the most payoff. This example shows the evaluation of such a pair.
The first two trees describe the two applications in the following meaning. The possible courses of the working process are shown by the paths from the root to a leaf. The solid squares show the decision points, at which the applicant offers Issuer to choose a branch to continue. It describes the possible decisions of the applicant, for example choice of faster or cheaper shipment, number of employees, etc. The other branching points are the chance events. This describes, for example, the effect of an error, a failure of equipment, weather conditions, illness or simply faster or slower progress concerning the work. In this example, which way to continue is chosen randomly with 1/2 probabilities for each branch, and the applicant agrees in taking any risk with 0 expected value. The numbers denote asked payments called costs in the case of the corresponding branch. At the bottom tick denotes the success and cross denotes the failure.
First applicant asks 2 units of money beyond his expenses. His task is either started at the beginning with a cost of 5 and probability of the success of 1/2, or he makes preparations for the cost of 1, and later if Issuer wants then he can try to complete the task for the cost of 6 with probability 1/2. In the other application, the cost plus the desired expected payoff of the other task is 7 and the probability of the success is 1/2. The timing of the events are represented by their heights.
The third tree is a "product" of the two trees that is it describes their possible aggregate execution. We can construct it by following the applications by time, and creating an appropriate branching if it occurs in one of them, and then continue this on both branches. At the bottom, tick denotes the success of both tasks, and cross denotes the failure of either, and the number shows the total payment asked by the applicants. We define the values of the endstates as 60 if both tasks succeeds and 0 otherwise, minus the total payments. We define the values -denoted by italicsof all states from the bottom to the top. Values of states in a same edge are the same. The value before a decision point is the maximum of the values after. The value before each chance event is the mean of the values after.
This way Issuer surely gets the value of the starting state, because at the decision points, he asks the decisions by which the value of the state remains the same, and at the chance events he pays the signed difference between the values of the states after and before, and at the end, he gets the value of the endstate. And each applicant gets the costs of his process, his asked extra payment and some random payment with expected value 0.
For the first applicant this means that Issuer asks him -a bit surprisingly -to work by the second way, that is to make only preparations, and then Issuer either asks him to do nothing and he gets 3, or Issuer ask him to try it, and he gets 9 and ±30 for the risk, so he gets 39 if he succeeds, and he pays 21 if he fails. For the second applicant this means that he gets 12 besides his costs if he succeeds (that is 19 in total), but Issuer deducts 12 from his payment (that is he pays 5) in the case he fails.
(If you are annoyed with these extremly high risks then let us note that these are the peculiarity more of this simple and risky example than of the method. For a more real-life example, you may consider this project as an instance of many identical projects that should be made parallelly.)
The basic model
There are a player I called Issuer and some other players A i called applicants. The working process of each applicant is described by his stochastic decision tree T (A i ), which is a rooted branching tree structure consisting of the following terms.
The inner nodes of the tree are of two kinds: the chance events and the decision points. To each chance event we assign probabilities to the edges leaving it. The third kind of nodes are the leaves. Each of them has an outcome and a real cost assigned. There is a time (an absolute point in time) assigned to every node, and for each edge the time assigned to the parent is not later than to the child.
The meaning of the tree is the following: the possible courses of his working process are the paths from the root to a leaf. In the case of a path, the outcome of the leaf is achieved at its time for the cost of the leaf. At a decision point, he can choose on which branch to continue. At a chance event, which branch to continue is chosen randomly with the assigned probabilities. The time of this point is when he learns the outcome of the event. Chance events of different applicants are assumed to be independent.
At the beginning, each applicant learns his decision tree, Issuer learns a utility function u : {sets of possible outcomes} → R, and Issuer can declare his strategy in public.
Then Issuer chooses some applicants, and they can work according to their decision trees. Communication is allowed throughout the process. Each applicant can make such contract with Issuer that determines real monetary transfer between them depending on the achieved outcome of the applicant and the communication between them.
At the end, beyond the monetary transfers, Issuer gets u(set of achieved outcomes) payoff, and each chosen applicant pays the cost of his reached leaf.
By default, expectation E means conditional expected value given the starting information and strategies of the applicants; that is expectation is taken only over the chance events. The expected value of the payoff is which each player aims to maximize.
We do not assume anything about the information the players get about each other. We consider only cases with competitive setting, or at least, with no indispensable applicant.
As an extension of the model, some disjoint sets of applicants may form coalitions, that is, they aim to maximize the total expected utility of all applicants in the set. By default, coalitions are not allowed.
The tendering strategy
Definition 1 Application of an applicant A i is a function a i : {outcome} × {communication between him and Issuer} → R, describing his asked payments in the different cases.
Issuer makes his strategy common knowledge. He uses the strategy by which the process of the game is the following. Of those, he chooses the one that maximizes his minimum possible payoff.
1. Each applicant learns his decision tree and Issuer learns his utility function.
Each applicant submits an application.
3. Issuer accepts or rejects each application.
Applicants with accepted applications can work according to their decision trees, and they
can communicate with Issuer. Issuer can communicate with the applicants.
5.
At the end, the payoff of a rejected applicant is 0. If Issuer accepts applicants A 1 , ...A k , and the achieved outcome, the communication and the cost of A i are O i , M i and C i , respectively, then
, (For the sake of simplicity, sets may be represented by a sequence of its elements, and we may omit some arguments of functions.)
The set of all applicants is denoted by App and the set of all submitted applications is denoted by app. We assume that all points in time of different nodes are all different; and we assume a strictly best combination of applications to accept, that is we do not handle the case of ties.
Second price tender
Definition 2 For each set S of applications, we define the payoff from the applications denoted by pf(S) as this maximum of Issuer's minimal payoff if he gets these applications. Surplus value of an application a means v + (a) = pf (app) − pf (app − a).
Second price tender is the same as the first price one but Issuer pays v + (a) more to each applicant with application a. So, denoting the payoffs in the second price mean by p 2 ,
). Even in second price tender, we use the later defined functions by the first price mean.
Prime cost and fair strategies of applicants
We define the prime cost application pc(T ) corresponding to a decision tree T as follows. The applicant shows his decision tree that describes a communication protocol between him and Issuer by the following mean. At each decision point, Issuer chooses a branch to continue and sends it to the applicant. Before each chance event, Issuer sends such real assignments to the branches that weighted by the probabilities is 0. At each chance event, the applicant chooses a branch to continue and sends it to Issuer. At the end, Issuer has to pay the cost of the leaf plus for each chance event, the money assigned to the chosen branch; and the applicant has to deliver the outcome corresponding to the leaf in time. (If someone turns off the protocol then, for example, he pays ∞.) Clearly, this is an application.
f a(T, x) = pc(T ) + x is called a fair application for any x ∈ R called profit. Fair or prime cost strategy F x or F 0 of an applicant means submitting a fair or prime cost application (with profit x), and in the case of acceptance, choosing the decisions corresponding to Issuer's choice at each decision point, and at each chance event, choosing the branch of the protocol corresponding to the event in the decision tree. Clearly, the expected payoff of an accepted applicant with strategy F x is x. Fair applicant means applicant with fair strategy.
Evaluation of fair applications
In this subsection we describe precisely the evaluation shown at Section 2.
Consider each applicant with fair application with profit x as an applicant with x more cost in each leaf of this tree, and with prime cost application
We use the term of combined decision tree of set of applicants. We can construct it by following the trees of the applicants, and creating an appropriate branching in the combined tree if it occurs in one of the trees, and then we continue on all branches. The outcomes of the combined tree are the sets of the appropriate outcomes. (So the combined outcomes are all one-outcomeper-application sets.)
Issuer evaluates all subsets of app, and accepts all applications in one of the best sets. Consider the evaluation of such subset. We handle the set as a combined application meaning the offer for contract with all in the set. Notice that combined application of prime cost applications is the prime cost application of the combined decision tree.
We note that combined applications can easily be written in the form of application, but we omit the details.
A state of a decision tree means a point (not necessarily vertex) of the graphic tree like in the figure at the beginning.
Definition 3
The value v of a state of a combined decision tree means the maximum of Issuer's minimum payoff if all he would have accepted is the prime cost application corresponding to the subtree from the state.
The value of the starting state is the maximum of Issuer's minimum payoff provided that he accepts this set of applications. We can determine the value of each state by recursion, using the followings.
• The value of an endstate is the utility of the set of the outcomes.
• Values of states in a same edge are the same.
• If the values after a decision point are given, the value before the point is their maximum, as Issuer clearly chooses the more favourable option.
• Lemma 1 If the state before a chance event is S, the states after the event are S 1 , S 2 , ...S n and the probabilities given by the applicant are w 1 , w 2 , ...w n , respectively, then v(S) equals
Proof Assume that Issuer surely gets the value of the state after the event. It does not affect the value of the state before. In this case the moneys assigned to the branches by Issuer does not affect his expected payoff, so his expected payoff is x, so the value of this state is at most x. On the other hand,
x to the ith branch then he gets x in all cases.
Our recursion also shows that Issuer gets the value of the starting state as a fix payoff.
6 Efficiency of the tendering system 6.1 Efficiency of prime cost or fair strategies Lemma 2 The expected payoff of an applicant A with fair strategy and accepted application f a(T, x) is the profit x.
Proof At each chance event, the expected value of the money assigned to the randomly chosen branch is 0. That is why E(p(A)) is independent of these assignments, so let us consider them as 0 at each branch. In this case, A gets his cost plus the profit x, that is why his payoff is x. So E(p(A)) = x.
Definition 4 We call the sum of the payoffs of all players as the payoff of the system, and we denote it by p s . The interest of the system or of a player means the interest in getting more expected payoff.
The payoff of the system is a function of the strategies of the players and of the chance events. It is equal to the utility of the set of the outcomes minus the sum of the costs of the applicants (in both ways of tendering). Theorem 3 Given the set of accepted applicants, if all of them use fair strategy then they choose the decisions that makes E(p s ) the largest possible.
Proof After choosing the applicants, E(p s ) depends only on what decisions would be made at the decision points of the combined decision tree. We show that our method chooses the decisions by which E(p s ) is the largest possible.
We can determine this maximum expected payoff at each state by the same way as with the values of the states. At each leaf, the expected payoff of the system equals the value of this state plus the profits of the applications. All the other three relations with values of states are valid with the maximum expected payoffs of the system, too. So by induction, we get that the previous equation holds for every state, including the starting state. So the maximum possible E(p s ) equals the payoff from the applications plus the profits of the applications, which equals E(p s ) with Issuer's declared strategy.
Theorem 4 If all applicants use prime cost strategy then E(p s ) is the largest possible.
Proof Because of the previous theorem, what we only have to show is Issuer chooses the best set of applicants according to the interest of the system. Whichever Issuer chose, the expected payoff of each applicant is 0, so E(p s ) = p(I). That is why, when Issuer chooses such set of applicants by which his minimum payoff becomes the largest possible, then he chooses the set by which E(p s ) becomes the largest possible.
6.2 Interest in prime cost strategy in second price tender Theorem 5 In the second price tender, prime cost strategy of all applicants is a Nash-equilibrium.
Proof Consider an applicant A and assume that all other applicants use prime cost strategy. Using the equations
pf (app − a) does not depend on a. If A uses prime cost strategy, too, then p 2 (I) is fixed so equation holds; and Theorem 3 shows that it gains maximal E(p s ). To sum up, if each but one applicant uses prime cost strategy then the prime cost strategy of this applicant gains him the greatest possible payoff.
The basic results in first price tender
Definition 5 The value v of an application is the payoff from all applications constraining Issuer's strategies with he must accept this application. v(a) ≤ pf (app), with equality if and only if a is accepted. Furthermore, a is accepted if and only if v(a) > pf (app − a). We note that v + (a) = max(0, v(a)).
The value of a fair application is the value of the prime cost application minus the profit. So for a particular applicant, there is exactly one fair application with a given value.
Theorem 6 For an arbitrary applicant A and value, if every other applicant is fair then the fair strategy of A gains him the most expected payoff among all such strategies that use an application with this value.
Proof Consider again the profits of the other applicants as constant costs, so their strategies are considered to be prime costs; it does not modify the interest of the system. As the acceptance depends on the value, the only nontrivial case is when the value is big enough to accept.
Let us increase the cost of each leaf of the tree of A by as much as makes the value of his prime cost application v. It decreases his payoff by a fix amount, so it does not modify his interest. E(p(A) ). If A uses prime cost strategy then equation holds and Theorem 3 shows that it makes E(p s ) the largest possible. That is why, A is interested in prime cost strategy. With his original costs, this means that he is interested in fair strategy of the value.
Interest in prime cost strategy with perfect competition
As Issuer accepts the applications with the greatest values, in perfect competition, the applicants clearly aims to choose such strategy by which the value of his application is the largest possible, among all strategies by which his expected payoff would be nonnegative in the case of acceptance. As the value of an application depends on other applications, this aim defines a partial ordering only, but it is enough to prove the following theorem. (We note that expected value means here also of the choice of strategies of the applicants from their mixed strategy, but this will not matter.)
Theorem 7 In first price tender with perfect competition, prime cost strategy of all applicants is a Nash-equilibrium.
Proof Assume that every applicant except A uses prime cost strategy. What we have to prove is A should use prime cost strategy, as well.
Denote the strategy and the application of A by S and a. We note that efficiency and optimality are the same in perfect competition.
First price tender in imperfect competition
Of course, optimality and efficiency holds only in perfect competition. This section is only about the robustness of the method. Let the signed surplus value of an application a be v ± (a) = v(a) − pf (app − a). Clearly, v + (a) = max(v ± (a), 0) and v ± (a) > 0 if and only if a is accepted.
Assume here that each applicant has a probabilistic distribution of the set of all other applications. Let us use here probability P and expected value E without conditions; that is it is taken over all Nature's choice of the information of other players, the random choices from their optimal mixed strategies and the chance events.
Let f (S) = E(p(A)|S), x be the value by which f (F x ) is the largest possible, and V = v ± (F 0 ). With the application a of A, let D = V − v ± (a) = v(F 0 ) − v(a), e = E(D|D < V ). Theoretically, let us allow only for A to submit a strategy F (a) in which he submits the fair application with the same value as which v(a) would be if he submitted a instead.
Theorem 8
Proof a is accepted if and only if v ± (a) > 0 that is D < V .
From f (S) = P (a is accepted)E(p(A)|S, a is accepted), we get f (F e ) = P (e < V )e, and f (F (a)) = P (D < V )e, whence we can simply get the equation.
• If e ≤ 0 then f (S) ≤ 0 = f (F 0 ) ≤ f (F x ) so S cannot be better strategy. That is why assume that e > 0.
In practice, V and D are almost independent and both have single simple distributions, so P (E(D|D < V ) < V ) is probable not smaller than P (D < V ). That is why (P (e < V ) − P (D < V ))e is probable nonnegative. We note that if S is fair then D is constant, so both sides are the same.
• Theorem 6 states that if the strategies of the other applicants are fair then f (F (a))−f (S) ≥ 0, which remains approximately true if others are almost fair.
This shows that if the strategies of other applicants are not so far from a fair strategy then the best strategy of A is really close to a fair one, that is why the equilibrium should be near to fair strategies.
Coalitions in first price tender
Submitting more applications by the same applicant is equivalent to submitting one application in which the applicant shows all and offers Issuer to choose some of them. That is why forming a coalition is almost equivalent to considering them as one player with their combined decision tree; the only difference is that a coalition can apply with such application only that can be composed by the previous way. That is why for each set of applicants, forming coalition cannot be better than forming a consortium that is, playing as one ordinary applicant with their combined decision tree.
To sum up, in first price tender, the problem of coalitions can trace back to the unavoidable problem of consortiums. For example, if these coalitions remain perfect competition, then each applicant should do the very same as without coalitions.
Conclusion
In second price tender, absolutely truthfulness (with cooperativeness) is a Nash-equilibrium, and this way the expected payoff of the system is the largest possible. So if the competition keeps the expected total payoff of the applicants low then Issuer gets about the largest possible payoff.
In the first price tender, applicants are interested in approximately the same strategy but each of them should ask a constant more money called profit, which is his expected payoff in the case of acceptance.
The disadvantages of the first price tender are the loss through this approximation, and such set of applicants is chosen to play here that makes the expected payoff of the system minus the total profit of the applicants the largest possible. We note that the more perfect the competition the more negligible these disadvantages.
The advantage of the first price tender is that forming cartels of applicants can benefit for them only about as much as in a simple sealed bid problem, while in second price tender, if two applicants can submit such applications that are useless without each other then they may get so much payoff as they want.
Appendix

When Issuer also has a decision tree
Consider the extension of the model when Issuer also has a decision tree, and the utility depends on his outcome, too. Consider here this Extended Issuer as two players, one is considered as an indispensable applicant with the decision tree, and he uses prime cost strategy, and the other is the Issuer in the original mean with his max-min strategy. Then Extended Issuer's expected payoff equals Issuer's payoff, and all statements hold with this new set of players, that is why this method in the extended model is the same good as the original method in the original model.
Using this strategy of Extended Issuer is equivalent to choosing the strategy by which his minimum expected payoff only on his own chance events is the largest possible.
When applicants also have utility functions
Consider the extension of the model when some applicant A = A i has a utility function u A which is 0 if A is rejected, and may depend on the work of others if A is accepted; that is
(We could leave out −C i by modifying u A .) Then we define prime cost application by the same way, but decreased by u A . This way, with some corresponding changes, everything remains true what we have shown above.
Syntax of precedences
To show how precedences can be handled, we will see it in the following example.
Applicant A has to transport some material to applicant B, who cannot work without this material. In the formal description of the decision trees, all outcomes of A contains the delivery time t 1 , and all outcomes of B contains the time t 2 when he uses the material first. We consider the cases when the precedence t 1 ≤ t 2 does not hold as possible cases but with −∞ as the value of the utility function. Except for this aspect, the decision tree of B is the same as if the material would be ready to use from the beginning.
Modifications during the process
In practice, players do not learn their very difficult decision trees in explicit forms. That is why they can present it only in a simplified, approximating way. As we will see, it does not worsen the optimality so much. Even so, this loss can be much more reduced by the following observation.
Assume that someone whose application has been accepted can refine his decision tree during the process. It would be in the interest of the system to allow him to carry out such modifications.
The question is: on what conditions?
The answer is for us to allow modifications of applications, if the applicant pays the difference between the values of the actual states with the original and the new applications. From another point of view, considering the possible applications with the restriction of the earlier communication, an applicant can exchange his application to another one with the same value in the restricted mean. As it is shown above, exchanging to his really fair application is in his interest, and his interest in the modifications is exactly the same as the interest of the system in it.
From another aspect, this means that modifications are regarded as chance events with 0 probabilities in the original application, because such chance events do not alter the value of the application. (More precisely, we consider the limit of the cases when the probabilities tend to 0.) It may happen that in the beginning it is too costly for some applicant to explore the many improbable branches of his decision tree, especially if he does not yet know whether his application will be accepted; but later however, it would be worth exploring better the ones that became probable. This kind of in-process modifications is what we want to make possible. We show that the interest of each applicant in better scheduling of these modifications is about the same as the interest of the system in it.
The expected payoff of an applicant A with an accepted fair application is fixed and for a nearly fair applicant, the small modifications of the other applications have negligible effect. As the modifications of each applicant have no influence on Issuer's payoff and only this negligible influence on the expected payoff of other applicants, the change of the expected payoff of the system is essentially the same as the change of the expected payoff of A. This confirms the above statement.
On the other hand, it is clear that if the utility function is somewhat modified, then everything can be rescheduled according to the new goals. Moreover, Issuer is also interested in describing his utility function in the same schedule as it is in the interest of the system.
Risk-averse applicants
Assume that an applicant A has a strictly monotone valuability funcion g : R → R and he wants to maximize E(g(p(A))). We will see safety use of the case when g is concave in Section 8.9.
Definition 6
We define an application reasonable as almost the same as the fair application but at each chance event, but at the end, Issuer pays g −1 (g(cost of the leaf) + chance event (assigned value to the chosen branch).
By a reasonable application, in the case of acceptance, the expected valuability of the utility of the applicant is independent of Issuer's choices. If all applications are reasonable then Issuer's payoff remains fixed. If the applicant is risk-neutral then the reasonable application is fair. These are some reason why reasonable applications work "quite good". We do not state that it is optimal in any sense, but a reasonable application may be better than a fair application in the risk-averse case.
We note that if g(x) = c 1 − c 2 e −λx then the evaluation works in about the same way as with fair applications.
Simplifications and the case with no parallel tasks
The messages Issuer sends depend only on the earlier messages he got. That is why if an applicant is sure that Issuer gets no message from anyone in the time interval I = [t 1 , t 2 ] then, without decreasing the value of his application, the applicant can ask Issuer to send all his messages before t 1 , that he would send during I. Similarly, if Issuer surely sends no message during I then the applicant can send his messages that he would send during I, even at t 2 . Moreover, if Issuer surely does not communicate with anyone else during I then the applicant can ask Issuer to send all such messages before t 1 that he would send in different cases in this interval, and the applicant can send his messages only until t 2 .
Consider the following project. It consists of two tasks, and the second task can only be started after the first one accomplished. The outcome of each applicant for the first task (called first applicant) consists of his completion time C 1 . The outcome of each second applicant consists of his starting time S 2 and the time C 2 he completes; and his decision tree starts with doing nothing until an optional point in time that is S 2 , and then he can start his work. The utility function is f (C 2 ) for a decreasing function f : {time} → {money} if C 1 ≥ S 2 , and −∞ otherwise.
In this case Issuer always communicates with the applicant who is just working at the time. So using the above observation, we can get simplified applications of the following form with the same values as of the fair applications.
For each applicant for the first task, this application form is "We ask h(C 1 ) − g 1 (h) money for any h : {time} → {money} that is chosen by Issuer at the beginning", and for the second task this is "We ask f (C 2 ) − g 2 (S 2 ) money if we can start our work at S 2 and we complete it at C 2 ". h(C 1 ) and f (C 2 ) describe the penalties here. In the simplified fair applications, g 1 and g 2 are chosen in such way that make their expected payoff independent of the arguments, if the applicants use their best strategies afterwards.
If all applications are such then Issuer chooses a pair for which g 1 (g 2 ) is greatest. Then he chooses h = g 2 for the first applicant, and this way Issuer gets f (
In short, the applicants tell that for how much money would they complete the first task depending on the penalty, and the applied penalty for the chosen second applicant is the loss form the delayed completion, and the penalty for the first applicant is how much more the second applicant asks if he can start later. Issuer chooses the pair that gains him the most payoff.
If a first applicant has no choice in his decision tree, that is his completion time C 1 is a simple random value, then he should choose g 1 (h) = E(h(C 1 )) − c, where c is the cost plus the profit.
Controlling and controlled parties
For an example, consider a task of building a unit of railroad. An applicant A can make this task for a cost of 100, but with a chance 1% of failure, which would cause a huge loss 10, 000. Another applicant B could inspect and in the case of failure, correct the work of A under the following conditions. The inspection costs 1. If the task was correct then he does nothing else. If not, he detects and correct the failure with a chance 99% for a further cost 100, but he does not detect, so he does not anything with a chance 1%. If both of them use prime cost strategy and they are the accepted applicants for the task then the method works in the following way.
At the end, A gets 101.99 but pays 199 (totally he pays 97.01) compensation if he fails. B gets 1 if he correctly finds the task to be correct, he gets 200 if the task was wrong but he corrects it, but he pays 9800 if he misses correcting it.
Of course, with fair submissions both of them gets their profit more payment. It can be checked that the expected payoff of each applicant is his profit independently of the behaviour of the others, and Issuer's payoff is fixed.
Participants with limited funds
Our method requires each applicant to be able to pay so much money as the maximum possible damage he could have caused. But in many cases, there may be a plenty of applicants A, who cannot satisfy this requirement. However, accepting such applicant A may be a good decision, if A is reliable to some degree.
To solve this problem, A should find someone who has enough funds, and who takes the responsibility, for example for an appropriate fee. If the applicant is reliable to some degree then he should be able to find such insurer party B. (It can be even Issuer, but considered as another party.) This method may also be used when A has enough funds, but is very risk averse.
Here, A and B work similarly as in the previous section. The difference is B does not work here, and he knows the probability distribution of his outcome not from his own decision tree but from his knowledge about the reliability of the controlled party. This shows that the role of B can be combined with his role at the previous section.
We note that this section is only a suggestion for such cases, and it is not efficient or optimal in any sense.
Further notes
It has strongly assumed that none of the chosen players know better any part of the real decision tree of any other chosen player. Because for example, it may happen that an applicant A estimates the probability of an unfavourable event in his work to be 50%, but another one, called B knows that the chance is 60%, and he also knows that he has to proceed on two different decision branches in the two cases. If the application of A is fair then B can increase the costs in his application of the less probable case by 9x and decrease the costs in the other case by x. This way, he bets 1 : 1 with the other applicant on an event of 60% probability.
Because of this danger, A could rightfully say that larger bet can only be increased on worse conditions. Submitting reasonable application with concave valuability function makes something similar, that is another reason to use this.
In the market, there is a rate of growth above which it is worth to invest, and below which it is not. The asked payment in a prime cost submission should be the present value of the costs calculated on this rate. By this approach, many market niches are close to perfect competition.
Considering the tendering problem in isolation, if a company simply wants to make an offer for co-operation with another company then we can easily show that the best for him is offering a fair application.
This second price tendering may also be useful in genetic programming, when we want to find an efficient algorithm for such a problem that can be distributed into slightly dependent subproblems, while the subprograms for these subproblems should co-operate, and we can evaluate only their overall achievement. In this case we should experiment such subprograms parallelly that also submits applications, and we simulate here a competitive market with an Issuer that uses our second price tendering strategy.
If the form of all possible prime cost applications for each subproblem is simple enough then we may need to experiment less parameters in each subproblems than in the original problem, and that is why this method converges faster.
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